Mearsheimer’s folly: NATO’s Cold War capability and credibility by White, Kenton
Mearsheimer’s folly: NATO’s Cold War 
capability and credibility 
Article 
Accepted Version 
White, K. (2017) Mearsheimer’s folly: NATO’s Cold War 
capability and credibility. Infinity Journal, 5 (4). pp. 22­31. 
ISSN 2312­5888 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/80596/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: 
https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/195/Mearsheimers_Folly_NATOs_Cold_War_Capability_and_Credibility/ 
Publisher: IJ Group 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Page 1 of 20 
 
Mearsheimer’s folly: NATO’s Cold War 
Capability and Credibility 
Introduction 
Government policy is influenced by the analyses of high profile academics as well as by those within 
government. Professor John J Mearsheimer is a political scientist well-known for his work on 
conventional and nuclear deterrence, and proposer of the theory of Offensive Realism.1 In assessing 
what is sufficient for national defence and for collective defence Mearsheimer made bold 
statements about NATO’s capability which were clearly wrong, and could have been identified as 
such at the time. These kinds of bold analyses have been repeated, and defence policy has been 
influence by them. The same has been happening since the end of the Cold War, based on the post 
hoc assumption of “victory”, as happened after the end of the Cold War in 1991. NATO has 
developed new strategies to cope with the changing face of international tensions, such as the 
“enhanced forward presence” in the Baltic States, and Western Europe is facing new domestic 
political crises which make military spending and co-operation vulnerable. The influence flawed 
analyses can have on defence policy is dangerous in a world becoming less stable and certain by the 
day.  
The objective of this analysis is not to vilify Professor Mearsheimer, but to demonstrate the 
problems associated with making an analysis without sufficient knowledge of the detail in place, and 
indeed the potential misuse of such an analysis in creating and continuing policy making. 
Mearsheimer’s analysis 
From the formation of NATO until the end of the Cold War the credibility of NATO’s defences was 
discussed by defence professionals and academics. Most of those analyses failed to address the 
overall capability based on existing policy, doctrine, force structures and plans.2  An example was the 
analysis given by Mearsheimer on the probability of a Soviet victory in a war in Europe. This provides 
                                                          
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 
2 Jonathan Dean, ‘Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO’s Central Front Problems?’, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs) 64, no. 1 (1987): 61–82; Richard Simpkin, ‘Hammer, Anvil and Net - a Re-
Examination of Conventional Defence of the Nato Centre’, BAR, no. 72 (December 1982); Malcolm Chalmers 
and Lutz Unterseher, ‘Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets’, International 
Security 13, no. 1 (1988): 5–49; John Baylis, ‘NATO Strategy: The Case for a New Strategic Concept’, 
International Affairs 64, no. 1 (Winter  -1988 1987): 43–59; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Prospects for Conventional 
Deterrence in Europe’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, August 1985. 
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a useful perspective on the difficulties inherent in assessing the credibility of defence policy from a 
purely academic standpoint. 
In 1982 Mearsheimer wrote a paper entitled, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Europe”3 which 
was based on a chapter in his book, “Conventional Deterrence”.4 In this article, Mearsheimer 
examined NATO’s strategy and capabilities, and the prospects for what he described as a Soviet 
“blitzkrieg” against NATO. He concluded that, “… the task of quickly overrunning NATO’s defences 
would be a very formidable one.”5  
But Mearsheimer’s analysis is flawed in several ways, as I will discuss below. As Professor Williamson 
Murray wrote, “Any theoretical understanding … must arise out of real acts and occurrences in 
human conflict; one must not impose on the world the theoretical constructs or concepts arrived at 
independently of history and experience.”6 I will use the British 1(BR) Corps as the main example 
throughout this article to demonstrate the flaws in Mearsheimer’s analysis. 
Opportunity 
Mearsheimer focussed on the idea that war would start only if the attacker – in this case the Soviet 
Union and Warsaw Pact – was assured of success, and would be able to avoid the conflict 
degenerating into a war of attrition.7 He does not anticipate opportunistic “grabs” by the Soviet 
Union that NATO was poorly prepared to repel. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) view was 
summed up by Secretary of State for Defence Sir Francis Pym in 1980 when he warned the Prime 
Minister, “Short-warning aggression, and the prospect of short-duration war, is far more attractive 
to the Soviet Union …”8 Mearsheimer also ignored the idea that an attritional war favoured the 
Warsaw Pact. 
In the Government War Book, the MoD considered three outline scenarios for a transition to war.9 
The first was a “Slow Moving Crisis” which was described as allowing, “… the Cabinet/TWC 
                                                          
3 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, International Security 7, no. 1 
(1982): 3–39. 
4 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983). 
5 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 36, International Security. 
6 Williamson Murray, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 48. 
7 For a thorough discussion of the Soviet approach to war which was also inculcated into the other WTO 
armies, see Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane, Russak, 1982). 
8 Defence Policy and Programme, Appendix A, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 7th July 
1980, ‘UK Future Defence Planning’, n.d., para. 2, FCO 46/2171, TNA. 
9 ‘War Book Working Party: Post War Developments in the United Kingdom Transition to War Plans’, CAB 
175/32 (Cabinet Office, 11 November 1981), 14, CAB 175/32, TNA. 
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[Transition to War Committee] sufficient time to discuss and authorise individual GWB measures and 
… requests from Major NATO commanders …” Following this was the vaguely termed “Intermediate 
Timescales” which covered, “A crisis evolving in the intermediate timescale … intended to be dealt 
with by a combination of MPDs [Major Policy Decisions], individuall [sic] decisions and, where 
necessary, GDs [Group Decisions].” The last one, the Rapidly Moving Crisis, was described as a, “ … 
rapid transition from peace to war …” It was in a rapidly moving crisis that timescales for decision 
making were all important. It was sometimes also referred to as a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack. 
There was some confusion in both NATO and the MoD about the likelihood of warning of an attack. 
The NATO assumption was not that the Warsaw Pact would launch a surprise attack, but that there 
would be a steady deterioration of international relations over a period of more than 20 days, 
resulting in an outbreak of hostilities.10 Contrast this with the private comments of the US Secretary 
of Defense in 1979: “We estimate that the Pact could concentrate ground forces of five “fronts” – 85 
to 90 Divisions – for an attack on NATO’s Centre Region within about 15 days … the Pact could also 
assemble over 4,000 tactical aircraft … within three to five days.”11 A Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) assessment in 1977 anticipated that only two weeks warning would be available to NATO, 
perhaps even as little as two days, allowing a surprise attack to be launched.12 The Warsaw Pact 
might have a week of preparation before the signs were noticed by Western Intelligence;  
“… the Alliance may now receive as little as one week’s firm warning of the 
Warsaw Pact achieving full war posture. As short a time as 48 hours warning 
might be obtained in the less likely even of the Soviet Union choosing to 
optimize strategic surprise by opening hostilities before achieving a full war 
posture.”13  
Another concern within NATO was that a misunderstanding might lead to war, or war would be 
caused by unintentional pressures from one side on the other.14 It is difficult to conclude whether a 
miscalculation was expected to provoke a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack, or provide the Warsaw Pact 
                                                          
10 UKCICC 1252/1, ‘Home Defence and Security of UK Base: Home Defence Organisation; Command and 
Control of Home Defence Forces, Pre-Strike Phase’, n.d., para. 1, DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
11 Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial 
Meeting, 11 - 12th December 1979, ‘NATO Defence Planning Committee 1979’ n.d., FCO 46/1987, TNA. 
12 MO 15/3, ‘JIC Assessment of Soviet Threat’, 23 March 1977, PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
13 MO 15/3, The growth of Soviet military power, 23rd March 1977, ‘JIC Assessment of Soviet Threat’, para. 23, 
PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
14 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980’, Cmnd 7826 (London: HMSO, 1980), paras 
104–111. 
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with the excuse to initiate a planned attack. Some “opportunism” by the Warsaw Pact might have 
occurred if political events in NATO suggested it would be successful.15 
Hew Strachan, agreeing with John Mearsheimer, wrote in 1984 that, “NATO’s existing conventional 
defences certainly have their defects, but they are not so weak as to invite Soviet attack.”16 This 
position is opposed by a RAND report which identified lack of sustainability and overall weaknesses 
in the NATO defence. The report stated that a failure to improve NATO’s conventional forces would 
risk providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity for a, “… quick strike with a limited objective.”17 
The report’s author, Roger Facer, had been a senior civil servant in the MoD, and was therefore in a  
position to know the true situation. NATO had been aware of this particular threat18 but the plans in 
place did not provide for a conventional response to a quick strike (assumed to be akin to a “bolt-
from-the-blue”, or Rapidly Moving Crisis). The concern was that the Warsaw Pact could prepare for a 
full scale attack in 15 days or less,19 with much of the preparation going unnoticed, and NATO’s 
mobilisation delayed by political caution and Soviet distraction techniques. 20 
Research undertaken by this author has shown that, even from a standing start, and in a war that 
might become attritional, the Warsaw Pact would win the conventional battle simply by being able 
to remain in the fight.21 Although both Warsaw Pact “Opportunism”22  or “salami-slicing”, featured in 
NATO planning,23 the broad threat, as assessed by NATO and the British Government, was of an 
attack by the Warsaw Pact on NATO with not less than 48 hours’ warning: directly across the Inner 
German Border by large armoured conventional thrusts, including at least two tank armies in the 
                                                          
15 COS 1161/434B, Attachment, 18th May 1979, ‘NATO Planning and Strategy’, n.d., para. 11, DEFE 70/722, 
TNA. 
16 Hew Strachan, ‘Conventional Defence in Europe’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs) 61, no. 1 (1984): 41. 
17 Roger L L Facer, ‘Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response’, R-3209-FF (RAND, 
January 1985), v–vi. 
18 James R. Schlesinger, ‘A Briefing on NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces as Presented to Allied 
Ministers of Defense by the US Secretary of Defense’ (Washington, D.C., August 1973), B-5. 
19 Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial 
Meeting, 11 - 12th December 1979, ‘NATO Defence Planning Committee 1979’, FCO 46/1987, TNA. 
20 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 42. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Macmillan had authorised the Vulcan and Victor nuclear strike force to Alert Condition Three (fifteen minutes’ 
readiness, armed and fuelled) but was reluctant to disperse them to their war locations for fear of provoking 
Khrushchev. 
21 Kenton White, ‘British Defence Planning and Britain’s NATO Commitment, 1979 – 1985’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Reading, 2016). 
22 ‘Opportunism’ was the description given to expected Soviet and WTO action, at short notice, to situations 
seen as beneficial to their cause. COS 1161/434B, Attachment, Report on the Intelligence Working Group - MC 
161/79 and MC 255, 18th May 1979, ‘NATO Planning and Strategy’, para. 11, DEFE 70/722, TNA. 
23 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for 
the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, 16 January 1968, para. 10, MC 14/3, NATO. 
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1(BR) Corps sector:24 air attacks on all NATO members; and denial by the Soviet Navy of NATO 
maritime freedoms.25 The Chiefs of Staff Committee acknowledged in 1980 that the improving 
Warsaw Pact navy and air forces were particularly, “… better equipped and more adventurous now 
than they have ever been; their capability representing a formidable instrument for the exploitation 
of air power.”26 The scale of the changes in equipment levels was illustrated by the intelligence 
evaluation of Warsaw Pact aircraft production, which every six months was supposed to exceed the 
entire front line strength of the RAF.27 Improvements in tank development - for example the 
deployment of the T64 and T8028 – and anti-aircraft defence – the new range of surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) – meant that the forces deployed in Eastern Europe 
were not only quantitatively superior to NATO, but approaching qualitative parity as well.29 
Capability 
Mearsheimer is vague on “capability.” Are capability and credibility the same thing? There is a 
difference between credible deterrence and credible defence. One might deter, but not be capable 
of fighting a real war. This was certainly the situation with NATO’s conventional defence from the 
adoption of Flexible Response in 1967. Deterrence requires the appearance of credibility,30 whereas 
defence must consist of workable strategy, doctrine and tactics: credible defence must be 
sustainable through sufficient forces, equipment and supplies to stop the enemy achieving its 
objective. Lieutenant Colonel Professor Asa Clark characterised this as the difference between 
minimum deterrence and warfighting deterrence.31 The assessment of the levels required for 
credibility are different depending on whether one is considering deterrence (minimum deterrence) 
alone or deterrence and defence (warfighting deterrence). Conventional defence will inevitably 
                                                          
24 ‘The Counterstroke Future Battlefield Study’, DOAE Note 663/202 (DOAE, 31 August 1983), DEFE 48/1077, 
TNA. 
25 Annex to MO 15/3, ‘The Growth of Soviet Military Power’, 16th January 1978, ‘JIC Assessment of Soviet 
Threat’, PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
26 COS 1146/434B, Attachment, Memorandum to the Chiefs of the Defence Staff from J Duxbury, 15th May 
1980, ‘NATO Planning and Strategy’, 9, DEFE 70/722, TNA. 
27 MO 15/3, Annex, Chiefs of Staff report, The Growth of Soviet Military Power, 23rd March 1977, ‘JIC 
Assessment of Soviet Threat’, para. 4, PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
28 A development of the T-64, it was thought to be qualitatively very similar to the Chieftain and Abrams M1, 
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Main Battle Tanks (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1983), 78–79. 
29 Foss, Jane’s Main Battle Tanks, 78. 
30 See the section on ‘Rationality and Reason’, Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the 
Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 52–57; See also Herman Kahn, Thinking 
About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 37–38. Although Herman Kahn is 
writing about nuclear weapons, the intent and ability to use force is important in all aspects of deterrence. 
31 Asa A. Clark, ‘Deterrence versus War Fighting’, in Conventional Deterrence (Lexington, Mass: Lexington 
Books, 1984), 13–26. 
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require larger forces than minimum deterrence. Although never explicitly stated, NATO adopted a 
minimum conventional deterrence posture. 
How does one measure capability in military terms? Analysis of conventional capability has usually 
been a simple exercise in accounting, comparing the numbers of personnel, ships, aeroplanes and 
tanks and drawing conclusions. Usually done on a “NATO versus Warsaw Pact” basis rather than 
nationally, the comparison gives no indication of the capabilities of the supporting infrastructure to 
prosecute any hypothetical war.32 Professor Stephen Biddle offers an alternative which is an 
interesting mathematical analysis of what he terms “modern-system war” which diverges from the 
normal bean-counting exercise.33 There is no measurement for military capability other than the 
employment of that organisation in war. Only then will its true capability be seen. Furthermore, this 
misunderstanding of military capability seriously undermines Mearsheimer’s view of Realism and 
military capability as a measurement of a state’s power in international relations. 
It is clear that by using Mearsheimer’s simplistic analysis of capability the Argentinians should have 
beaten the British forces in Falklands. Equally, as Iraq had shown itself a capable enemy against Iran, 
the Iraqi defences in the First Gulf War of 1991 should have been much tougher to crack by the 
coalition. Capability measurement was significantly off the mark.34 
Mobilisation 
Mearsheimer dismissed the idea that the Warsaw Pact forces were capable of a standing start 
attack. The relative speeds of mobilisation by either side were cause for concern by Western 
planners, and this concern was recognised in their planning.35 Many of the scenarios for simulation 
were referred to by the respective mobilisation times for the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. The 
initial mobilisation day was referred to as M-day, and the first day of combat as D-day. There were 
several scenarios and settings which are used throughout the Government and NATO 
documentation, referred to in the style 5/3 or 31/24. The first number refers to the number of days 
the Warsaw Pact would have to mobilise and prepare, and the second number refers to how much 
                                                          
32 Chalmers and Unterseher, ‘Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets’, 
International Security; Lawrence Freedman, ‘British Foreign Policy to 1985. II: Britain’s Contribution to NATO’, 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 54, no. 1 (1978): 30–47; Hugh Faringdon, 
Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
PLC, 1986); Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, International Security. 
33 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
34 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, chap. 7. 
35 MO 15/3, The growth of Soviet military power, 23rd March 1977, ‘JIC Assessment of Soviet Threat’, para. 23, 
PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
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time NATO would have. There was a delay between the Warsaw Pact mobilising and NATO 
confirming mobilisation had occurred. The Government War Book states, “For planning purposes, it 
is assumed the most likely period of warning of hostilities would be 1-2 weeks …”36 but plans used by 
both the Government generally, and MoD in particular, used a longer period of warning thus 
enabling full mobilisation.37  
Rather than selecting the option of a delayed mobilisation of NATO, Mearsheimer chooses a similar 
type of scenario that most NATO exercises are predicated on: the Warsaw Pact mobilisation is 
followed by NATO with little or no delay. This conveniently allows full mobilisation of all available 
forces. This is recognisably similar to the WINTEX38 timescales and the 31/24 scenario where the 
Warsaw Pact mobilise for 31 days an NATO for 24.39 This particular scenario provides NATO with the 
greatest opportunity for full mobilisation, and, more importantly, full deployment.40 The drawback 
with this scenario is its failure to recognise the capability of the Soviets successfully to employ 
distraction methods to keep the Western countries guessing their intentions right up to the point of 
invasion.41 Mearsheimer states, “…there is little doubt that NATO would detect a full-scale Pact 
mobilization almost immediately.”42 However, little or no warning came from the Western 
Intelligence Agencies before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, who concluded before the invasion 
that, “We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at the moment preparing ground forces for 
large-scale military intervention …”43 Additionally, a US Presidential Inquiry in to the war scare in 
1983 showed that clear Warsaw Pact military preparations had been missed: “The Soviet air force 
standdown had been in effect for nearly a week before fully armed MIG-23 aircraft were noted on 
                                                          
36 ‘Cabinet Office War Book, Volume 2’, 1980, 1, CAB 175/31, TNA. 
37 Exercises used a build up over several months, with four weeks between NATO putting the armed forces on 
alert and the outbreak of war. ‘WINTEX-CIMEX 83 Committees’, 1983, CAB 130/1249, TNA; ‘Exercise Square 
Leg; Armed Forces Command and Control for Home Defence’, 1981, HO 322/950 - 951, TNA. 
38 WINTEX-CIMEX was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) intended to simulate NATO’s response to a worsening 
international crisis. The title comprises ‘Winter Exercise – Civil/Military Exercise’ and were performed 
biennially. It did not involve the deployment of troops. 
39 For example, see E W Lawrence, P M Sutcliffe, and Squadron Leader R Miller, ‘Maritime Operational 
Scenarios for Use in DOAE Studies’ (DOAE, December 1977), DEFE 48/980, TNA; ‘Crusader 80, Part A’, n.d., FCO 
46/2446, TNA; ‘NATO Exercise LIONHEART 84’, n.d., FCO 46/3059, TNA; ‘WINTEX-CIMEX 83 Committees’, CAB 
130/1249, TNA. 
40 The clear drawbacks of basing policy creation on the ‘best-case’ scenario are discussed in Kenton White, 
‘Britain’s Defence Fallacy and NATO’, British Army Review, no. 167 (Summer 2016): 38–49. 
41 MISC 93(83) 1, WINTEX-CIMEX 83 Pre-exercise information, Annex A, JIC assessment, ‘WINTEX-CIMEX 83 
Committees’, para. 4, CAB 130/1249, TNA. 
42 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 39, International Security. 
43 National Intelligence Officer, ‘Soviet Options in Afghanistan’, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 
(Director of Central Intelligence, 28 September 1979), 1. 
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air defense alert in East Germany.”44 Western intelligence seemed to have a problem identifying 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact mobilisations and preparations for war, and it is certainly possible that 
extensive mobilisation by the Warsaw Pact was feasible without NATO becoming aware enough to 
ask for the political decision to mobilise. 
He also assumes, wrongly as the facts show, that NATO mobilisation would occur smoothly and 
quickly. Sufficient warning was crucial to enable timely mobilisation of the Armed Forces. According 
to the Chiefs of Staff in 1978, mobilisation of the reserves would take, “… between 15-20 days …”45 
but this relied on several days’ warning time prior to mobilisation. In contrast to this upbeat 
appraisal, the units required to react most speedily give a different timescale. The Commandos were 
supposed to be available to respond rapidly to a sudden crisis. The Government War Book 
recognised that, “With no warning time or prior implementation of Transition to War Measures it is 
clear that it would take up to a fortnight to bring Commando Forces to a full war footing.”46 NATO 
responses to aggression would be slow initially, allowing for mobilisation to take effect. 
Herein lie the main problems: firstly, knowledge of how quickly troops can or cannot be deployed 
was essential to be able to develop plans: secondly, without stores and ammunition they could not 
fight; without logistic support they would not have ammunition. When so much of the planning 
involved the use of non-regular troops, timing and warning were crucial. According to the 
Government War Book, the plans to provide logistic support to British forces in continental Europe 
would take nearly four weeks, “… dependent on mobilisation and requisitioning powers …”47  
The timescales for mobilisation and deployment had not changed from those of the late 1970s, but 
the exercises to test them became more media focussed than before. For Exercise Lionheart in 1984 
the 8,500 men of 1st Infantry Brigade, a regular formation, embarked at Marchwood military port, 
near Southampton, and arrived 36 hours later at Esbjerg, Jutland.48 An exercise such as this was 
good publicity, showing the troops streaming onto and off RORO ferries at ports in England and 
Denmark.49 No mention was made of either the lack of enemy interdiction, or the reliance on civilian 
                                                          
44 ‘The Soviet “War Scare”’ (President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 15 February 1990), 8, George H W 
Bush Presidential Library. 
45 MO 15/3, Annex A, 16th January 1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, n.d., 2, 
PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
46 TO.2119/431/80, Annex A, ‘Ministry of Defence (MOD) War Book’, n.d., 8, DEFE 24/1418, TNA. 
47 Measure 3.39, ‘Government War Book, Volume 1’ (Cabinet Office, 1985), CAB 175/53, TNA. 
48 David C. Isby and Charles Kamps Jr, Armies of NATO’s Central Front (London: Jane’s, 1985), 305. 
49 Exercise Lionheart Days 1 - 10, VHS, Exercise Lionheart 84 (Ministry of Defence, 1984); Drew Middleton, 
‘British Start War Games on the Continent’, The New York Times, 18 September 1984, US edition. 
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equipment, especially dock facilities. This coverage also conveniently avoided mentioning the 
missing logistical troops, all reservists. 
Transport for the mobilisation of some units might have proved troublesome, depending on the 
timing. According to Colonel Hellberg, in 1982, when the Commando Brigade was mobilised for the 
Falklands, “… British Rail were unable to reposition their rolling stock in time to meet any of the 
deadlines …” because a weekend was approaching.50 The Brigade had to rely instead on hastily 
arranged road transport to move its supplies. In a full mobilisation, the movement of ammunition by 
road and rail would be made easier by a relaxation of the laws preventing explosives being 
transported, but there would have been a hugely increased demand for that rolling stock.51 
Protection of that rolling stock, and the transport infrastructure generally, would pose many 
problems if war were to break out. 
Operations and Deployments 
Basic assumptions made by Mearsheimer regarding force deployment, doctrine and tactics were 
flawed. NATO cannot deploy its “… 30 brigades along the front in the traditional ‘two brigades up, 
one back’ configuration.”52 In the Belgian sector, there were two small divisions deployed, and the 
same in the Dutch sector. The Dutch were reluctant to deploy troops forward in peacetime for 
financial reasons, so unless there was enough warning the mobilisation and deployment of these 
brigades remained in question.53 
Mearsheimer’s diagram representing the “Initial Distribution of NATO Divisions” shows the sectors 
as having all their divisions “up” in the forward defence line, and all equally capable.54 Using the 
British sector as an example it is shown with four divisions in the battle-line. In reality, at least one of 
1(BR) Corps’ divisions is allocated to rear-area defence, some 100km behind the front line and 
predominantly filled by reservists (2nd Infantry Division).55 This division was not equipped with the 
same level of anti-tank capability or protection available to the Armoured Divisions. The 3rd 
Armoured Division is held in reserve to counter-attack any penetration of the main line, in 
                                                          
50 Colonel IJ Hellberg, ‘An Experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines’, in The Falklands 
Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future, Sandhurst Conference Series (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 
110. 
51 To Authorise the Easing of Restrictions for the Conveyance of Military Explosives Through United Kingdom 
Ports, Measure 3.43, ‘Government War Book, Volume 1’, CAB 175/53, TNA. 
52 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 27, International Security. 
53 ‘NATO Short Term Initiatives’ (MOD, 1978), DEFE 11/811, TNA, D/DS6/7/107/1, Briefing notes for Secretary 
of State for Defence, Visit to the UK by Netherlands Defence Minister, 26th January 1978. 
54 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, fig. 2, International Security. 
55 Isby and Kamps Jr, Armies of NATO’s Central Front, 269. 
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accordance with the doctrine of the “Counterstroke”. The Counterstroke, “ … is a counter attack 
with the specific aim of destroying enemy forces which are on the move …”56, an approach which 
relied upon mobile forces identifying and attacking weaknesses in the enemy advance, at short 
notice and using reserves specifically kept for this purpose. It relied upon mobility in a fluid battle, 
highly trained troops, good communications between the units involved, and flexible command. 
General Bagnall’s development of the British Army doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s promoted this 
use of mobile defence and manoeuvre rather than the previous static, attritional defence.57 General 
Sir Nigel Bagnall was commander 1st British Corps in Germany, and then of NATO Northern Army 
Group, and proposed the doctrine of the “Counterstroke” to thwart the mobile Soviet attacks. 
According to the DOAE, there would be, “… a greater emphasis on offensive action …”58 This 
“Counterstroke” doctrine was further refined by General Farndale who succeeded Bagnall as GOC 
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).  
This then leaves two divisions “up”, less their forward battle groups and reconnaissance units, 
defending the 65km front in the British sector. These are the 1st and 4th Armoured Divisions which 
were intended to fight the initial high intensity battles against the Warsaw Pact forces. These 
consisted of four brigades (sometimes three, depending on which White Paper was the latest). 
Furthermore, many units permanently stationed in BAOR were kept under strength, and the cadre 
companies and units were to be brought up to strength during a crisis by the mobilisation of regular 
reservists using the Individual Reinforcement Plan. These personnel were for the reinforcement of 
units categorised as “A1”, the highest state of preparedness. As such, the reinforcements were 
expected to be with their units no later than 48 hours after being called up. 59 The Individual 
Reinforcement Plan intended that those ‘A1’ categorised units would receive their reinforcements 
within 48 hours of mobilisation. As part of this process, newly released reservists, presumably more 
experienced with current training, would be prioritised for allocation to Germany.60  
From the analysis of the wargames, and the timescales involved in mobilising and transporting the 
reinforcements to the continent, it was possible that the Armed Forces would face a similar problem 
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to that of the BEF in 1940 during the retreat to Dunkirk:61 had a breakthrough of the front line been 
created, the rear area troops would have been ill equipped to stop it.62 In BAOR, some non-front-line 
units were equipped with Saxon armoured personnel carriers (the armour of which was supposed to 
be proof against only small calibre weapons), and yet others only had lorries. Rear-area troops, such 
as the 2nd Infantry Division, were poorly equipped to fight a mechanised, fast moving enemy, having 
reduced numbers of anti-armour and other heavy weapons, as well as limited mobility.  
Sustainability 
Mearsheimer stated that NATO had, “… the wherewithal to deny the Soviets a quick victory and then 
to turn the conflict into a lengthy war of attrition …”63 In fact, the sustainability of NATO’s 
conventional defences, certainly in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), was inconsistent with his 
viewpoint. Critical to the sustainability of the defence of NATO were levels of war reserves, and their 
maintenance and availability. The situation at that time was summed up in a memorandum to the 
Minister of State for Defence: 
“Among the most serious shortfalls are Army air defence and anti-tank 
missiles (Blowpipe, Rapier, Swingfire, Milan, Tow) and [RAF] air-to-air missiles 
(Sidewinder, Sparrow, MRAAM). [Based on the latest plans] stocks of 
Blowpipe by 1980 will be sufficient for less than 5 days at intensive rates and 
stocks of Rapier, only 2 days. [Similarly] 5 days’ stocks of Milan will not be 
accumulated until 1987/88 and of Swingfire until 1984/85. Heavy ammunition 
is also in short supply, for example Chieftain APDS (3 days’ stocks by 1980) 
[Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot], 155mm shells for FM70 [Artillery piece] 
(2½ days’ in 1980) and 51mm Mortar ammunition (3½ days by 1980).”64  
The Chiefs of Staff advised the Government in 1981 that, “… BAOR did not have the capability to 
sustain conventional warfare in the Central Region for more than four days …”65 The indications 
were that vital stock such as anti-tank missiles and tank rounds would be used up within three days.  
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Because of this lack of reserve stocks, in the event of a drawn out war in which nuclear weapons 
were not used, NATO could suffer defeat through attrition alone. The war reserves of ammunition, if 
not fuel, equipment, vehicles and personnel, would be used up within the first few days of a war. 
The concept of a longer war was discussed in NATO, but not given significant weight.66 This lack of 
sustainability reached through all the Armed Services, and was threatened by additional cuts to the 
stocks. The Vice Chairman of the Defence Staff wrote in 1981; 
“… BAOR does not have the capability to sustain conventional warfare for 
more than 4 days without resort to nuclear weapons. I am … dismayed to see 
that … rather than enhancing our logistic posture the Army are proposing a 
reduction in B vehicles and spares, in order to reach baseline targets. An even 
more serious prospect is that in order to reach second-line targets both the 
RN and Army would have to make swingeing cuts in stock levels of key items 
including Sidewinder missiles, the new tank gun round and rockets for the 
new multiple launch rocket system. I cannot believe this is right.”67 
Any idea of a sustainable deterrent force in Europe was undermined by these significant deficiencies 
in ammunition stocks, logistical handling, resupply and reinforcement. The Chiefs of the Defence 
Staff wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence in the following terms: 
“Present (and past) policies have thus dangerously lowered the nuclear 
threshold and represent (of necessity) a return to the ‘trip-wire philosophy’ 
of the early 1960s at a time when we no longer have strategic nuclear 
supremacy and possibly not even parity.”68   
The Sterling value of the shortfall of war reserves for the UK was not insignificant. The Armed Forces 
showed nearly a £1000m deficit (in 1979 prices) in stockpile requirements in 198069 and following 
the defence review of 1981, if the finances were to be provided as planned, the three services would 
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take up to a decade to rectify the shortfall.70 The projected cost alone of providing additional 
SWINGFIRE71 war reserves was £201M (1978 value).  
In 1981, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) wrote that, 
“… Alliance capabilities today are clearly inadequate to meet the growing 
Warsaw Pact conventional threat. Instead of possessing the variety of 
capabilities which would truly translate into flexibility in response, NATO is 
left in a posture that in reality can only support a strategy more accurately 
labeled [sic] a ‘delayed tripwire.’ The amount of delay following a 
conventional Warsaw Pact attack before the tripwire would be activated and 
NATO would face resorting to the nuclear option would depend on such 
variables as length of warning time and the timeliness and appropriateness of 
decisions taken by political authorities.”72  
Intelligence and analysis from NATO suggested the Warsaw Pact forces were configured for a war of 
at least several weeks.73 The Warsaw Pact had forward based war stocks providing two weeks’ 
offensive support as well as ammunition and fuel stocks to fight a high intensity war for about two 
months. 74 
Warsaw Pact Tactics 
The idea that the Warsaw Pact would use “steamroller” tactics was criticised by Mearsheimer,75 
despite this being the approach anticipated by BAOR and NATO generally.76 This is predicated on 
Mearsheimer’s incorrect understanding of Blitzkrieg, and Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation of 
their method of attack. Mearhseimer states in the footnote of page 12 that there has been no, “… 
systematic study of this military strategy.”77 Dr Ned Wilmott described Blitzkrieg as, “…  a broad 
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frontal attack in order that the enemy front should be gripped, thereby ensuring that contact could 
not be broken … With the enemy’s attention held, the main blow(s) would fall on a relatively narrow 
frontage by concentrated armour and motorized forces.”78 A NATO report from 1984 states that the 
Warsaw Pact forces are, “… organised and equipped to take the offensive right from the beginning of 
a conflict.”79  
Mearsheimer states that the Soviets did not have, “… a neatly packaged doctrine for fighting a 
conventional war.”80 But that is precisely what had been developed from the success of “deep 
battle” in World War Two. Soviet doctrine had always espoused speed and mass, and the latest 
iteration of this was the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG).81 Intended to break into the rear 
areas of NATOs defences, this was of deep concern to NATO commanders. The US Army Field 
Manual on Soviet Operations and Tactics proposed the purpose of a Soviet attack was, “… to carry 
the battle swiftly and violently into the enemy rear.”82 This effect would be amplified if NATO units 
fought following the policy of “Forward Defence”.83 The direct threat to the forces in Europe was 
summed up in the Battle Notes for 1(BR) Corps: “Soviet military doctrine requires that offensive 
operations are mounted by a superiority of tanks, infantry and artillery … The primary aim of such 
operations will be the destruction of NATO’s defensive capability …”84 The doctrine relied on an 
attack making a quick breakthrough of the “crust” of NATO’s “Forward Defence”.  The Soviet 
frontage for a division in attack formation, “… is normally 15 to 25 kilometres wide. This width could 
vary considerably with the situation.”85 Mearsheimer repeats the idea that Soviet forces would not 
be able to concentrate to achieve a marked local numerical superiority, but that they would be 
echeloned. Here he misunderstands the idea of echelonning in the attack. The forces do not pile up 
one behind the other, but are fed through regularly, so that the defenders have no let up to 
reorganise or redeploy.86 In the US Field Manual FM100-2-1, an instance is cited of a World War Two 
Soviet Corps attacking across a front only seven kilometres wide achieving a 17-to-1 superiority in 
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tanks87 which effectively invalidates Mearsheimer’s “Force-to-Space Ratio” argument.88 
Furthermore, the US 1st Infantry Division breached the Iraqi defences in 1991 on a front of only 6 
kilometres.89 In contrast, in the main battle area of BAOR the British divisions which were “up” were 
expected to defend a frontage of 30-35 kilometres each. It would certainly have been feasible, had 
the Warsaw Pact forces wished to break through the British Corps front, to have achieve a greater 
than 3:1 superiority at the point of attack, normally assumed to be the minimum for success. 
Furthermore, Mearsheimer’s dismissal of armour heavy formations being detrimental to the Soviet 
ability to fight a mobile war is in direct contradiction to a CIA report on the uses of the Operational 
Manoeuvre Group. He comments that, “…Soviet divisions have become extremely heavy units … 
Past a certain point … there is an inverse relationship between the mass and velocity of an attacking 
force. As the size of the attacking force increases, the logistical problems as well as the command 
and control problems increase proportionately.”90 The CIA report describes a Front OMG as, “ … an 
armor-heavy [sic] formation varying in size from corps (two-divisions) to army (three or four 
divisions).”91 It would also be capable of, “ … a wider range of tasks, and designed to operate farther 
from friendly forces.”92 The Soviet doctrine placed emphasis on flexibility and less dependence on a 
long logistical tail for the OMGs. 
Mearsheimer continues to confuse blitzkrieg and the Soviet way of war in World War Two, claiming 
that the Soviet forces, “… instead of relying on deep strategic penetrations … Soviet strategy called 
for wearing the German Army down by slowly pushing it back along a broad front.”93 The Red Army 
performed multiple penetration and encircling operations during the last years of the war, piercing 
the overstretched Axis defences and penetrating in depth. During the Cold War the Warsaw Pact 
planned to achieve local superiority to break through the NATO line in several places. This led 
Mearsheimer to another misunderstanding: that multipronged advances by the Warsaw Pact would 
be beneficial to NATO. Mearsheimer writes, “… it will, at best, end up pushing NATO back across a 
broad front …”94 but he  does not take into account the “holding” battles or “grip” described by 
Wilmott above, along the whole front which would not allow the NATO forces to disengage and 
                                                          
87 US Department of the Army, ‘The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics’, 2–7, Field Manual, FM 100-2-1. 
88 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 26–28, International Security. 
89 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 139. 
90 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 30, International Security. 
91 CIA, ‘The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group’, Intelligence Assessment (Directorate of Intelligence, Office of 
Soviet Analysis, February 1983), 1. 
92 CIA, ‘The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group’, Intelligence Assessment, 1. 
93 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 13, International Security. 
94 Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, 19, International Security. 
Mearsheimer’s Folly - NATO’s Cold War Capability and Credibility 
Page 16 of 20 
 
retire in order. Probably the most concerning point made by Mearsheimer is the idea that some 
parts of the front would not need defending in any strength because of the, “… obstacles along the 
NORTHAG front …”95 such as rivers, forests and cities. This is remarkable reminiscent of the 
complacent thinking of 1940 and 1944 regarding the Ardennes.  
Successful attacks – those made by the Warsaw Pact which break into and through the NATO line – 
would be reinforced from the subsequent echelons and OMGs, and there would not be a “broad 
front” retreat by NATO. A Warsaw Pact attack would aim to punch holes through the NATO front, 
allowing Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG) to attack the rear areas and encircle NATO forces.96  
According to Professor Michael MccGwire,  
“the strategy of defeating NATO by conventional means … entailed the 
creation of ‘operational maneuver [sic] groups’ that would paralyze NATO’s 
command and communication system by seizing its neuralgic points before 
its political leaders could make up their minds about resorting to nuclear 
weapons.”97  
This also had the effect of tightly intermingling the opposing forces so that tactical nuclear weapons 
could not be used for fear of hitting one’s own troops. 
General Bagnall experienced the effects of Warsaw Pact doctrine during a wargame with a Soviet 
trained Afghan officer, Colonel Wardak, in 1983. Wardak had escaped from Afghanistan after the 
Soviet invasion in 1979. General Bagnall invited him to a wargame at 1(BR) Corps HQ where Wardak 
employed the training he had received at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy.98  By using an 
attack on the British sector, he fixed the British forces with frontal attacks and forced them to 
commit their reserves. On doing so, his Warsaw Pact forces broke through the Dutch and Belgian 
Corps on the flanks and surrounded 1(BR) and 1(GE) Corps. 99  Warsaw Pact victory was total. 
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Mearsheimer indicates that the Warsaw Pact overall had a 2.5:1 superiority in tanks and 2:1 in 
infantry.100 He takes a very optimistic view of the ability of NATO to prepare for and repel an attack, 
but he takes a conversely pessimistic view of the Warsaw Pact’s ability to prepare and launch that 
attack.101 Mearsheimer does not present any nuances of the competing strategies, doctrine and 
tactics which might reveal a different outcome to his conclusion. He omits entirely the airborne 
capability and Operational Manoeuvre Group concept, both of which were important to Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact doctrine. These omissions undermine the validity of the argument he puts forward.  
The use of simple “bean-counts” to compare forces gives little meaning to the analysis. By invoking 
the concept of Blitzkrieg, Mearsheimer undermines his own conclusion. A brief comparison with 
“Fall Gelb”102 is instructive. In 1940, the Allies considered their position strong, with greater forces 
and more capable weapons.103 A simple evaluation of forces sizes was inadequate to assess the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. Britain and France could field 3,383 tanks, while 
Germany only 2,445, with a balance of infantry divisions.104 Following Mearsheimer’s approach to 
force comparisons, in 1940 the Allies should have easily held off the German attack. History shows 
that this did not happen, and the cause was not numbers, but a difference in the thinking and tactics 
employed.105 The planning and doctrine proved the difference between successful attack and 
defence.  
The problems associated with fighting through cities are mentioned, but it was Soviet doctrine to 
“hug” cities, rather than become involved in street-fighting. The idea was that by hugging the city 
(meaning infiltration of the outer suburbs but no serious attempt to occupy the entire city) NATO 
could not deploy nuclear weapons, and the defenders of the city would be effectively cut off from 
the battle by minimal forces. 
Conclusion 
The credibility of NATO’s conventional defence relied upon sufficient weapons, with adequate 
supplies of ammunition and enough well trained personnel to use them. Despite Bagnall’s 
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improvements in tactics and operations, as well as developments of more accurate and 
sophisticated “smart” weaponry, if those weapons ran out of ammunition before the enemy’s did, or 
the trained soldiers, sailors and aircrew were not available to use them, then they were effectively 
useless. General Thompson wrote, “The consequences of dependence upon defective stockpiles do 
not bear thinking about, for it could spell nothing short of disaster.”106 The proliferation of ATGWs 
towards the end of the 1980s went some way to making up the numerical inferiority of NATO 
against the Warsaw Pact. There was still the problem that a large number of anti-tank weapons 
would have been deployed in the reinforcement phase, which would have meant a degradation of 
the army’s ability to stop and hold a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack. The “holding force” had both 
insufficient numbers and low reserve stocks to fight any attack. 
Mearsheimer’s analysis seems to be based partly on the idea that belief and fact are the same thing, 
and partly on an ignorance of the true state of affairs – taken in by the western propaganda. The 
sufficiency of arms and men was not the real problem, but the “come as you are” approach 
extended to a severely limited supply of ammunition which meant attrition would only work one 
way. 
NATO strategic documents make clear the need for sufficient war reserves to maintain credibility,107 
but continual “cheese-paring” was a constant problem within the MoD.108 Once spending had been 
set, new cost cutting measures would leave the Service Chiefs with little or no room for manoeuvre, 
the contracts for major systems and spending already having been signed. The only place for cuts 
would therefore be in training, fuel and spares. The inadequacy of the stocks and supplies for 
warfighting, as well as the over-dependence on reservists, were displayed in both the Falklands and 
the First Gulf War. It was questionable if the Armed Forces were as capable as many wanted to 
believe. 
The effects of the “victory” in the Cold War can be seen in changes to the defence policies of the 
NATO countries after 1991. The theory was that minimum deterrence had worked, and the notion, 
amongst others, that it did not matter what reserves of ammunition were available, and that 
reliance on reservists to fulfil front-line duties, were acceptable. Professor Colin S Gray warned 
against relying on theory, despite its apparent clarity. “Historical accuracy is far more important than 
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clarity that misleads. The cost is too great in providing a distorting mis-characterization of strategy 
by theory that is neat at the price of inaccuracy.”109 
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Figure 1 - Mearsheimer’s distribution of divisions on the Central Front 
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Figure 2 – Actual British Corps defence area, Isby, and Kamps, Armies of NATO’s Central Front,  
p269 
